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PROOF OF PHYSICAL CHILD ABUSE
By John E.B. Myers* and Linda E. Carter**
Child abuse is maddeningly difficult to prove. Maltreatment occurs in se-
cret, and the child is usually the only eyewitness. Many children are too young
or too frightened to testify.1 Tragically, some victims do not live to tell their
story.2 Often, the only evidence is the bruised and battered body of a little
child.3 The purpose of this Article is to shed light on some of the difficult
evidentiary questions plaguing physical abuse litigation.
Section I describes evidence intended to prove that a child's injuries are
* Associate Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law.
** Associate Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of
Law.
The authors wish to express their appreciation to Ms. Petra Wright for her valua-
ble assistance in preparing the manuscript for this article.
1. A substantial percentage of child abuse victims are very young. In a Califor-
nia study, 37 % of reported cases of child abuse involved children five years of age or
younger. The percentage of victims between birth and age two was 19.4%. OFFICE OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, COMMISSION ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF CHILD ABUSE LAWS
1-2 (1985). In a study prepared by the American Humane Association, 43 % of abused
and neglected children were between birth and five years of age. AMERICAN HUMANE
ASSOCIATION, HIGHLIGHTS OF OFFICIAL CHILD NEGLECT AND ABUSE REPORTING
1985, 15 (1987).
2. According to official reports, 1,200 children died as a result of abuse in 1986.
See Kantrowitz, How to Protect Abused Children, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 23, 1987, at 70;
see also infra text accompanying note 174. A sad percentage of children who die from
maltreatment are very young. The American Humane Association reports that
"[c]hildren who are reported as fatalities are much younger compared to all involved
children - their average age is 2.0 versus 7.1 years." AMERICAN HUMANE ASSOCIA-
TION, supra note 1, at 20.
3. In a child homicide case, the Utah Supreme Court spoke of the difficulty en-
countered in proving abuse. Justice Durham, writing for the court, stated that "[t]he
key evidence in this case is the mute testimony of the body of three-year-old Tawnya
Tanner." State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, 541 (Utah 1983).
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nonaccidental. The Section begins with discussion of the battered child syn-
drome. This is followed by an analysis of the types of injuries that are indica-
tive of abuse. Attention then turns to admissibility of photographs of a child's
injuries. From there, the discussion focuses on the foundation, permissible ba-
ses and limits of expert testimony on the battered child syndrome. Section I
concludes with discussion of uncharged misconduct evidence to prove non-acci-
dental injury. Section II is devoted to methods of establishing the identity of
the perpetrator.
I. EVIDENCE WHICH ESTABLISHES THAT A CHILD'S INJURIES WERE
NONACCIDENTAL
Statutory definitions of physical abuse vary slightly from state to state. In
the main, however, abuse is defined as nonaccidental physical injury. In prov-
ing physical abuse the state encounters two primary evidentiary difficulties.
First, it must prove that a child's injuries were nonaccidental, and second, it
must identify the perpetrator. On the first issue, discussion of the battered
child syndrome is an appropriate beginning. Expert testimony describing the
syndrome plays a key role in abuse litigation.
A. Battered Child Syndrome
Dr. Henry Kempe and his colleagues coined the term "battered child syn-
drome" in their seminal 1962 article describing the syndrome. Dr. Kempe de-
scribes the battered child as follows:
The battered child syndrome may occur at any age, but, in general the af-
fected children are younger than 3 years. In some instances the clinical mani-
festations are limited to those resulting from a single episode of trauma, but
more often the child's general health is below par, and he shows evidence of
neglect including poor skin hygiene, multiple soft tissue injuries, and malnu-
trition. One often obtains a history of previous episodes suggestive of parental
neglect or trauma. A marked discrepancy between clinical findings and histor-
ical data as supplied by the parents is a major diagnostic feature of the bat-
tered-child syndrome .... Subdural hematoma, with or without fracture of
the skull ... is an extremely frequent finding even in the absence of fractures
of the long bones .... The characteristic distribution of these multiple frac-
tures and the observation that the lesions are in different stages of healing are
of additional value in making the diagnosis.4
4. Kempe, Silverman, Steele, Droegmuller & Silver, The Battered-Child Syn-
drome, 181 J. A.M.A. 17 (1962). It is important to note that not all abused children
demonstrate symptoms of battered child syndrome. As Kempe states in his classic
description of the battered child, sometimes injury is the result of "a single episode of
trauma." Id. In fatal child abuse in particular, many victims do not demonstrate the
requirements of the battered child syndrome. See Zumwalt & Hirsch, Pathology of
Fatal Child Abuse and Neglect, in THE BATTERED CHILD 247 (R. Heifer & R. Kempe
4th ed. 1987), where the authors write that "in our experience approximately 15-20
percent of child abuse fatalities fulfill [the] criteria for the battered baby syndrome
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Courts agree that battered child syndrome is an accepted medical diagno-
sis which is recognized with approval by medical science.5 Expert testimony on
the syndrome is routinely approved.6 In fact, every appellate court which has
considered such evidence has approved it.7 Judges are comfortable with the
syndrome because it is based on signs and symptoms that are verifiable by
physical examination, x-ray, and other objective medical techniques. The pri-
mary function of expert testimony on the syndrome is to establish that a
child's injuries were not accidental.8 As the Pennsylvania Superior Court re-
marked,"[t]he battered child syndrome simply indicates that a child . . . has
not suffered ... injuries by accidental means."9
In addition to stating that injuries were nonaccidental, an expert may
render an opinion on the means used to inflict injuries. 10 In People v. Jack-
.... [F]atalities from an isolated or single beating are as common as fatalities from
repeated physical assault (battered baby syndrome)." Id. at 251-58.
5. State v. Moyer, 151 Ariz. 253, -, 727 P.2d 31, 33 (Ct. App. 1986); State
v. Dumlao, 3 Conn. App. 607, -, 491 A.2d 404, 409 (1985) ("Battered child
syndrome has become a well established medical diagnosis."); State v. Tanner, 765
P.2d 539, 543 (Utah 1983) ("We are satisfied that the concept of the battered child
syndrome is grounded in scientific research and is widely accepted in the medical com-
munity."); see also State v. McClary, 207 Conn. 233, -, 541 A.2d 96, 102 (1988)
(shaken baby syndrome is generally accepted by medical science). For further discus-
sion of the general acceptance of battered child syndrome by medical science, see infra
subsection I. D-1 of text.
6. See, e.g., United States v. Bowers, 660 F.2d 527, 529 (5th Cir. 1981) ("Proof
that a child suffers from the battered child syndrome may show that the parent's expla-
nation of the child's injuries is a fabrication."); Eslava v. State, 473 So. 2d 1143 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1985) (murder prosecution); People v. Jackson, 18 Cal. App. 3d 504, 95
Cal. Rptr. 919 (1971); Bell v. Commonwealth, 684 S.W.2d 282 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984);
State v. Durfee, 322 N.W.2d 778 (Minn. 1982); People v. Henson, 33 N.Y.2d 63, 304
N.E.2d 358, 349 N.Y.S.2d 657 (1973); State v. Wilkerson, 295 N.C. 559, 247 S.E.2d
905 (1978); Commonwealth v. Rodgers, 364 Pa. Super. 477, 528 A.2d 610 (1987);
State v. Holland, 346 N.W.2d 302 (S.D. 1984); State v. Best, 89 S.D. 227, 232
N.W.2d 447 (1975); Huerta v. State, 635 S.W.2d 847 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (evidence
of battered child syndrome properly admitted in murder case); State v. Tanner, 675
P.2d 539 (Utah 1983); State v. Mulder, 29 Wash. App. 513, 629 P.2d 462 (1981);
Annotation, Admisibility of Expert Medical Testimony on Battered Child Syndrome,
98 A.L.R.3D 306 (1980).
7. See State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, 543 (Utah 1983) ("Our research shows
that all courts which have addressed the question have affirmed the admission of expert
medical testimony regarding the presence of the battered child syndrome."). But see
State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, 551 (Utah 1983) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
8. See People v. Jackson, 18 Cal. App. 3d 504, 507, 95 Cal. Rptr. 919, 921
(1971) ("the 'battered child syndrome' simply indicates that a child found with the
type of injuries outlined above has not suffered those injuries by accidental means");
State v. Dumlao, 3 Conn. App. 607, -, 491 A.2d 404, 409 (1985).
9. Commonwealth v. Rodgers, 364 Pa. Super. 477, .. , 528 A.2d 610, 614
(1987).
10. People v. Jackson, 18 Cal. App. 3d 504, 507, 95 Cal. Rptr. 919, 921 (1971);
State v. McClary, 207 Conn. 233, -, 541 A.2d 96, 100 (1988);-State v. Jurgens,
424 N.W.2d 546, 549 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, 542
1988]
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son," the California Court of Appeal wrote that "[a]n expert medical witness
may give his opinion as to the means used to inflict a particular injury, based
on his deduction from the appearance of the injury itself' 2 For example, the
expert could state that a skull fracture was probably caused by a blow from a
blunt instrument such as a fist. The expert's description of the cause of injury
may include an opinion that the injury was probably caused by "a person of
mature strength."' s
Courts generally permit experts to respond to questions which ask
whether injuries could have happened in a particular way. For example, an
'expert should be permitted to respond to a question such as, "Could an injury
of this type have been caused by throwing the child against a wall?" Addition-
ally, the expert may be asked "whether the explanation given for the injuries
is reasonable.'
4
In child abuse litigation, the state's evidence is often an amalgam of cir-
cumstantial proof. In State v. Muniz,'5 the court acknowledged this reality,
and discussed the role of circumstantial evidence:
The State was obligated to prove its case against defendants here, as in so
many child-abuse cases, by means of circumstantial evidence. If circumstan-
tial evidence is of sufficient quality to convince a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt of defendant's guilt, it does not matter that it is circumstantial ....
Circumstantial evidence is often more persuasive than direct evidence .... It
has been recognized in numerous cases that criminal activities are ordinarily
not recognizably performed in the open, proof of such activities can only be
established by circumstantial evidence.16
It is clear from the Muniz case and from other decisions 17 that a criminal
(Utah 1983).
11. 18 Cal. App. 3d 504, 95 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1971).
12. Id. at 507, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 921 (citing Estate of Rowley, 257 Cal. App. 2d
324, 340, 65 Cal. Rptr. 139, 149, (1967)).
13. State v. Mulder, 29 Wash. App. 513, 515, 629 P.2d 462, 463 (1981). Testi-
mony that an injury was probably inflicted by a person of adult strength is admissible
to identify the perpetrator by reducing the class of persons who could be responsible for
the injury. For further discussion of techniques used to identify the abuser, see infra
section II of text.
14. State v. Tanner, 675. P.2d 539, 544 (Utah 1983).
15. 150 N.J. Super. 436, 375 A.2d 1234 (1977), cert. denied, 77 N.J. 473, -,
391 A.2d 488 (1978).
16. 150 N.J. Super. at 441-42, 375 A.2d at 1236-37 (citations omitted).
17. See State v. Dumlao, 3 Conn. App. 607, -, 491 A.2d 404, 410-11 (1985)
("Circumstantial evidence may be used . . . to establish the elements of the crimes
charged."); Owen v. State, 514 N.E.2d 1257, 1258 (Ind. 1987) ("criminal conviction
can be based solely on circumstantial evidence"); State v. Jurgens, 424 N.W.2d 546,
555 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Ostlund, 416 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987);
State v. Muniz, 150 N.J. Super. 436, 441-42, 375 A.2d 1234, 1236-37 (1977); State v.
Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, 550 (Utah 1983) ("We have frequently stated that circumstan-
tial evidence alone may be competent to establish the guilt of the accused."); State v.
Johnson, 135 Wis. 2d 453, 457, 400 N.W.2d 502, 504 (Ct. App. 1986) ("Appellate
courts have recognized the necessity of extensive reliance on circumstantial evidence in
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verdict or juvenile court adjudication of abuse can be predicated on circum-
stantial evidence. Of particular relevance to the present inquiry, a finding of
nonaccidental injury can be premised partially or entirely on expert testimony
on battered child syndrome.1 8
The trial court balances the evidentiary value of expert testimony on the
syndrome against the potential that the evidence may be unfairly prejudicial
to the defendant. 9 In order to reduce the possibility of prejudice, the court
may limit the expert's use of the label "battered child syndrome."20
Finally, "battered child syndrome" is a medical diagnosis based on expert
observation of a child's damaged body."' The diagnosis does not depend on
evidence of defendant's conduct toward the child. Nor does it hinge on proof
of defendant's character or propensity to abuse children. In other words, testi-
mony on the battered child syndrome is not character evidence. Thus, testi-
mony on the syndrome is not barred by the rule prohibiting evidence of a
person's character to prove that the person acted in conformity therewith on a
particular occasion.1
2
B. What Types of Injuries are Probably Nonaccidental
To evaluate the credibility and probative value of expert testimony on the
battered child syndrome, it is helpful to understand the types of injuries that
are probably nonaccidental2 3 This section describes those injuries. The discus-
prosecutions involving child victims." Defendants were charged with assault and injury
or risk of injury to a child.).
18. See State v. Moyer, 151 Ariz. 253, -, 727 P.2d 31, 33 (Ct. App. 1986);
State v. McClary, 207 Conn. 233, -, 541 A.2d 96, 101 (1988).
19. State v. Moyer, 151 Ariz. 253, __, 727 P.2d 31, 33 (Ct. App. 1986)
("Once the court finds this evidence relevant, it must determine whether it is unduly
prejudicial pursuant to Rule 403. . . ."); see also State v. Dumlao, 3 Conn. App. 607,
-', 491 A.2d 404, 409 (1985); State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, 547 (Utah 1983).
20. State v. Mulder, 29 Wash. App. 513, 516-17, 629 P.2d 462, 463-64 (1981).
21. See State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, 545 (Utah 1983).
22. Id.
23. For helpful discussion of nonaccidental injuries, see People v. Gordon, 738
P.2d 404 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987). In this criminal child neglect case arising out of the
death of a nine-month old infant, the state offered expert testimony from Dr. Richard
Krugman, Director of the University of Colorado Medical School's National Center for
the Prevention and Treatment of Child Abuse and Neglect, a nationally respected ex-
pert in the field of child abuse. Dr. Krugman testified that:
[E]ight diagnostic factors can be used to determine whether a child's injury is
nonaccidental: a discrepant history of injury; delay in seeking medical atten-
tion; stress-producing family crisis; a triggering event by the child; a history
of abuse by the adult abuser; physical or social isolation of the abuser; unreal-
istic expectations of the child by the abuser; and a pattern of increasing sever-
ity of injury.
Id. at 406. See also State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, (Utah 1983). In Tanner, four
physicians testified about the condition of the child. The court's summary of the testi-
mony of one of the experts is instructive. The court wrote:
1988]
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sion draws heavily from two leading treatises on child abuse: The Battered
Child,24 edited by Drs. Ray Heifer and Ruth Kempe, and Child Abuse and
Neglect: A Medical Reference,25 edited by Dr. Norman Ellerstein.
1. Diagnostic Value of Parents' Explanation of Injury
When a physician suspects that a child's injuries are nonaccidental, the
doctor pays close attention to the parents' explanation of the injuries. Particu-
lar attention focuses on the following factors:
a. Unexplained Injury
When a child is examined by a doctor, some parents deny any knowledge
that the child was hurt. Other parents acknowledge the injuries, but offer no
explanation as to how they happened. In many cases, both situations are
suspicious.21
b. Implausible Explanation Offered by Parents
One of the strongest indicators of nonaccidental injury is an explanation
"which is implausible and inconsistent with common sense and medical judg-
ment."12 7 For example, parents may describe a minor accident to explain major
injury. The parents may state that a child with a severe skull fracture and
multiple body bruises fell from a couch onto a carpeted floor. Alternatively,
parents may state that an injury happened when a child engaged in activity
the child could not perform.2" For example, the parents may state that a four-
month-old baby was burned when she climbed onto a stove and turned on the
burner.
Dr. Palmer testified regarding the phenomena that alert a physician to the
possibility of the battered child syndrome, such as: too many bruises and
bruises in atypical locations considering the child's age; fractures, such as spi-
ral fractures, of a type and severity not otherwise explained; severe head inju-
ries not otherwise explained; and in general, a history of the trauma given by
a caretaker that is inconsistent with the child's injuries. The doctor also testi-
fied that abusive disciplinary methods are frequently part of the battered
child syndrome, that the parents of such children are typically very young or
inexperienced and that they are likely to have a history of prior abusive con-
duct. Dr. Palmer went on to identify in Tawnya the characteristics of the
battered child, emphasizing in particular the inadequate explanation given by
the defendant for Tawnya's injuries.
Id. at 544.
24. THE BATTERED CHILD (R. Heifer & R. Kempe 4th ed. 1987).
25. CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: A MEDICAL REFERENCE (N. Ellerstein ed.
1981).
26. See Schmitt, The Child with Nonaccidental Trauma, in THE BATTERED
CHILD 178 (R. Heifer & R. Kempe 4th ed. 1987); see also People v. M.V., 742 P.2d
326, 327 (Colo. 1987).
27. Schmitt, supra note 26, at 179.
28. Id.
[Vol. 53
CHILD ABUSE
An implausible explanation is critically important for diagnostic purposes.
In addition to its medical value, numerous courts hold that implausible expla-
nations have another use in child abuse litigation. The trier of fact may con-
sider implausible explanations as circumstantial evidence of abuse.2" For ex-
ample, in Payne v. State,30 the court remarked that
a jury may consider and give weight to any false and improbable statements
made by an accused in explaining suspicious circumstances .... When we
consider the defendant's improbable statement in this case together with the
nature of the injuries to the child, the medical opinion evidence, and the de-
fendant's opportunity, we are persuaded that, taken together, they are suffi-
cient to constitute substantial evidence of guilt31
c. Discrepant Explanations Offered by Parents
When abuse is suspected, parents should be questioned in separate loca-
tions. Since abusive parents seldom disclose the real cause of their child's inju-
ries, they have to invent excuses. When parents are questioned separately,
their excuses may be inconsistent. The inconsistency undercuts the validity of
both explanations, and may point toward abuse.
d. Alleged Self-inflicted Injury in a Young Infant
Young babies cannot crawl, and they generally are unable to inflict seri-
ous injuries on themselves. 32 For example, a parent's statement that a month-
old infant broke her arm by climbing onto a chair and falling off is untrue.
Furthermore, children rarely hurt themselves on purpose.
29. See Payne v. State, 21 Ark. App. 243, 247, 731 S.W.2d 235, 236-37 (1987);
People v. Gordon, 738 P.2d 404, 406 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987) (nationally respected ex-
pert in child abuse, Dr. Richard Krugman, testified that "a discrepant history is found
in nearly all cases of child abuse, that is, the abuser will give an explanation of the
child's injuries that does not comport with the medical diagnosis"); Cohoon v. United
States, 387 A.2d 1098, 1100 (D.C. 1978); State v. Durfee, 322 N.W.2d 778, 783
(Minn. 1982); Schleret v. State, 311 N.W.2d 843, 845 (Minn. 1981) ("Crucial to iden-
tifying such cases are the discrepancies between the parent's version of what happened
to the child when the injuries occurred and the testimony of medical experts as to what
could not have happened, or must have happened, to produce the injuries."); People v.
Henson, 33 N.Y.2d 63, 71-73, 304 N.E.2d 358, 362-63, 349 N.Y.S.2d 657, 663-64
(1973); Childs v. State, 744 P.2d 567, 568 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987); State v. Johnson,
135 Wis. 2d 453, 456-59, 400 N.W.2d 502, 504-06 (Ct. App. 1986); see also State v.
Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, 544 (Utah 1983) ("[T]he expert should be able to testify in
detail regarding the nature of the child's injuries and whether the explanation given for
the injuries is reasonable.").
30. 21 Ark. App. 243, 731 S.W.2d 235 (1987).
31. Id. at 247, 731 S.W.2d at 236-37.
32. Schmitt, supra note 26, at 179.
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e. Alleged Sibling-inflicted Injuries are Suspicious
Statements that a sibling caused serious injury should be regarded with
suspicion.3
f. Delay in Seeking Medical Care
Delay in obtaining medical care may indicate nonaccidental injury.3 4 The
concerned parent with nothing to hide normally seeks immediate help for seri-
ous or life-threatening injury.
2. Bruises
Bruises are one of the most common types of nonaccidental injury. Every
parent knows, of course, that nonabused children get bruised. Thus, it is im-
portant to differentiate accidental from nonaccidental bruises. The most com-
mon site of accidental bruises is skin overlying bony prominences such as
knees and shins. Bruises of the forehead are common in children who are just
learning to walk. Bruises from falling are usually circular or oval shaped with
nondescript borders.35
Nonaccidental bruises frequently occur at sites ivhere accidental bruising
is unlikely. For example, nonaccidental bruises are often found on the but-
tocks, lower back, abdomen, lateral thighs, and other soft-tissue areas." Geni-
tal or inner-thigh bruises37 are sometimes inflicted as punishment for toileting
mishaps. In such cases, sexual abuse should also be suspected. 38
The hand can cause various types of pressure bruises, including grab
marks and squeeze marks. Such bruises are oval-shaped and resemble finger
prints. In some cases an outline of the fingers is actually visible, such as when
a child is slapped on the cheek.39
In large measure, a diagnosis of battered child syndrome is based on evi-
dence that a child suffered a series of injuries over time. Such proof undercuts
the probability of accident because a normal, healthy child is unlikely to suffer
one suspicious accidental injury after another. As the California Court of Ap-
peal observed in People v. Jackson,40 "it would take thousands of children to
33. Id. at 179-80.
34. See People v. Gordon, 738 P.2d 404, 406 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987); see also
Schmitt, supra note 26, at 180.
35. Schmitt, supra note 26, at 186-87.
36. Id. at 180-86.
37. See State v. Moyer, 151 Ariz. 253, - , 727 P.2d 31, 32 (Ct. App. 1986)
("Bruising was found on the child's inner thighs, a place where bruising is usually not
caused by accident.").
38. Schmitt, supra note 26, at 180.
39. Id. at 183.
40. 18 Cal. App. 3d 504, 95 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1971).
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have the severity and number and degree of injuries that this child had over
the span of time [involved] by accidental means.""' One way to determine
whether a child's injuries occurred over time is to ascertain whether the inju-
ries are in various stages of healing. Evidence of injuries in various stages of
healing is particularly telling when parents assert that all injuries occurred at
one time.
Physicians are often asked to date bruises so as to determine whether they
occurred at different times. Determining the approximate age of such injuries
is possible because as bruises heal they progress through a predictable se-
quence of changes in shape and color. Precise dating is not possible, however,
because while the sequence of healing is predictable, the rate of healing is not.
Despite this imprecision in dating bruises, it is often possible to determine that
bruises occurred at different times.
In general, if a bruise is swollen and tender, it is probably less than two
days old. The initial color may be red, blue, or purple. As the bruise heals, it
changes color. The changes begin at the edge of the bruise. At about five days,
the bruise turns a greenish color. Within a few more days, the color changes to
yellow, and eventually to brown. The brown color may persist for several
weeks .42
3. Human Bite Marks
"Human bite marks leave distinctive, pared, crescent-shaped bruises that
contain individual teeth marks."' It is possible for a physician or forensic
dentist to differentiate a bite inflicted by a child from one caused by an adult.
Additionally, a properly qualified dentist may offer expert testimony on the
origin of bite marks.44
4. Strap, Lash, and Loop Marks
Straps leave rectangular bruises of various lengths. Lash marks are nar-
row and straight-edged. Loop marks are caused by blows from a doubled-over
cord or similar instrument. 5 The nature of strap, lash, and cord bruises stand
in stark contrast to accidental bruises, which usually overlie a bony promi-
nence, and are circular and nondescript.
5. Inflicted Head Injuries
One of the most dangerous and deadly forms of abusive injury is subdural
41. Id. at 507, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 921.
42. For discussion on the of dating bruises, see Schmitt, supra note 26, at 192.
43. Id. at 183.
44. See id.; see also Annotation, Admissibility of Evidence Tending to Identify
Accused by His Own Bite Marks, 77 A.L.R.3D 1122 (1977).
45. Schmitt, supra note 26, at 186.
19881
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hematoma." Subdural hematoma is an accumulation of blood in the subdural
space.47 The dura are fibrous membranes covering the brain. Acute subdural
hematoma presents a life-threatening emergency which may require immedi-
ate surgery. In the chronic form of subdural hematoma, blood builds up grad-
ually, and symptoms may not appear until weeks following an abusive
attack.4
8
Subdural hematoma is commonly associated with skull fracture. The frac-
ture can be caused by a direct blow or from being hit or thrown against a wall.
Nonaccidental subdural hematoma can also occur without skull fracture. In
young children, such injury can be caused by violent shaking.49 Nonaccidental
brain and spinal cord injury caused by shaking is often called shaken baby
syndrome, or whiplash shaking syndrome.
In many cases, parents state that serious head injury was caused by an
accidental fall. 50 Certainly, head injury can occur this way. However, when
parents assert that serious head trauma was caused by an accidental fall from
a bed, crib, couch, or similar item of furniture, research conducted by Helfer,
Slovis and Black dictates a skeptical response. 1
Helfer and his colleagues studied 161 young children who accidently fell
46. For discussion of abusive head injury resulting in death, see Zumwalt &
Hirsch, Pathology of Fatal Child Abuse and Neglect, in THE BATTERED CHILD 259-65
(R. Helfer & R. Kempe 4th ed. 1987).
47. DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 588 (26th ed. 1981).
48. Id. at 409, 1017.
49. For cases involving nonaccidental whiplash injury caused by shaking, see In
re James B., 166 Cal. App. 3d 934, 939, 212 Cal. Rptr. 778, 781 (1985); State v.
Gordon, 738 P.2d 404, 405 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987); State v. McClary, 207 Conn. 233,
541 A.2d 196 (1988); Brown v. State, 512 N.E.2d 173, 175 (Ind. 1987); State v.
Bolden, 501 So. 2d 942, 947 (La. Ct. App. 1987); State v. Ostlund, 416 N.W.2d 755(Minn. Ct. App. 1987); In re E.J., 741 S.W.2d 892, 893 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). See also
Caffey, The Whiplash Shaken Infant Syndrome: Manual Shaking by the Extremities
with Whiplash-Induced Intracranial and Intraocular Bleedings, Linked with Residual
Permanent Brain Damage and Mental Retardation, 54 PEDIATRICS 396 (1974); Dykes,
The Whiplash Shaken Infant Syndrome: What Has Been Learned?, 10 CHILD ABUSE
& NEGLECT 211 (1986).
50. See, e.g., Cohoon v. United States, 387 A.2d 1098 (D.C. 1978). In Cohoon,
the defendant was found guilty of mayhem, malicious disfigurement and cruelty to chil-
dren. The defendant's seven-month-old son had suffered head injuries while in defend-
ant's care. The defendant "testified that he had been lifting the baby out of the crib
when he accidentally dropped the baby to the floor." Id. at 1099. Two physicians testi-
fied for the government:
According to Dr. Falik, qualified as an expert in the field of neurological sur-
gery, and Dr. David Breckbill, a pediatric neuroradiologist at Children's Hos-
pital, the child's injuries were the result of his skull striking a flat surface at
an accelerated rate of speed. In their opinion, the degree of acceleration nec-
essary to produce the injuries was greater than, and inconsistent with, [de-
fendant's] explanation of how the injuries occurred.
Id.
51. Helfer, Slovis & Black, Injuries Resulting When Small Children Fall Out of
Bed, 60 PEDIATRICS 533 (1977).
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out of cribs or beds. Fully 80% of the children were uninjured. Seventeen
percent had a minor injury such as a bruise or cut. Only two children had
skull fractures. Importantly, none of the children had subdural hematomas or
serious injury! Based on this research, parents' assertions that serious head
injuries were caused by falling out of bed or off a couch are appropriately met
with suspicion.5
6. Abdominal Injuries
Abdominal injuries are a common cause of death in battered children.53
Such injuries often result from a punch or kick that compresses the injured
organ against the spinal column. Significant force is needed to inflict such in-
juries, and expert testimony describing such force is often compelling. In State
v. Johnson,5 for example, a physician stated that a child's fatal injuries were
caused by "a concentrated force comparable to what ... would result from a
fifty or sixty mile per hour head-on collision. 5
7. Child Abuse by Burning
Burns caused by scalding water are the most common type of inflicted
burn.56 Nonaccidental burns are often inflicted as punishment. 57 The child
may be held under scalding tap water or restrained in a tub of hot water.58
Dr. Kenneth Feldman writes:
When hot water has just been drawn, the bottom of the sink or tub remains at
a lower temperature than the water it contains. If an infant's body is forcibly
opposed to the bottom of the container, it may be spared burning. This cre-
ates an unburned central area-the hole in the doughnut effect.... An unre-
strained child in a tub of hot water may be unable to extricate himself, but
will usually thrash about, creating splash burns, [and] blurring of the water-
line margin ..... When restrained, such splashing and blurring may be mini-
mal, and clear margins of the burn allow one to reconstruct the child's posi-
52. See id. at 535, where the authors write that "we must conclude that severe
head injury and damage or injury of any type are extremely rare when children, ages 5
years or less, fall out of bed." It should be noted, however, that despite the results of
this study, serious accidental head injury does occasionally result from what appears to
be a minor fall. See Zumwalt & Hirsch, supra note 46, at 260.
53. See Zumwalt & Hirsch, supra note 46, at 265-66; Schmitt, supra note 26, at
189-90.
54. 135 Wis. 2d 453, 400 N.W.2d 502 (Ct. App. 1986).
55. Id. at 460, 400 N.W.2d at 505; see also State v. Jurgens, 424 N.W.2d 546,
549 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (physician testified child's injuries were "caused by an
external force or trauma equivalent to the force generated in a train wreck").
56. Feldman, Child Abuse by Burning, in THE BATTERED CHILD 199 (R. Helfer
& R. Kempe 4th ed. 1987).
57. Id. at 201.
58. For a case in which a child suffered nonaccidental bums, see State v. Moyer,
151 Ariz. 253, 727 P.2d 31 (Ct. App. 1986).
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tion in the water.59
Burns which leave clear margins on the extremities are frequently called
stocking or glove burns.60 One would usually expect to see splash burns caused
by the child's efforts to free herself, rather than distinct margins.
In addition to scald burns, contact with hot surfaces or cigarettes can
cause inflicted burns. Dr. Feldman describes such burns as follows:
Contact burns are the second most frequent cause of abusive burns. A major-
ity involve contact with hot metal objects such as irons, stove burners, or
heater grates. If such injuries occur by accident, brief, glancing contact of
exposed body parts with a small portion of the hot surface is the rule. Abusive
acts may result in prolonged, steady contact with a large portion of the hot
surface. Symmetrical, deep imprints with crisp margins of the entire burning
surface will suggest abuse, as opposed to small burn areas with slurred mar-
gins lacking a full imprint of the burning surface. Accidental contact burns
are usually deeper and more intense on one edge of the burn. Burning of areas
of the body where accidental brushing contact is unlikely, such as buttocks or
perineum, suggests abuse.... Abusive contact burns also occur when small
objects are heated and used to brand children. The top of metal cigarette
lighters and knife blades are commonly used. Clear imprints of the burning
object are often seen.
A separate group of contact burns is seen in our cigarette-smoking culture.
Adults often have burning cigarettes on hand during times of frustration and
may inflict deep, circular cigarette burns on their children. These burns are
often grouped and multiple, most often involving the hands and arms. Al-
though accidental cigarette burns occur when a child brushes against a
lighted cigarette that an adult is holding, these injuries are usually single,
shallower, and not circular. Abuse should be suspected when cigarette burns
are present on normally clothed body parts.6"
8. Fractures
Many abused children suffer nonaccidental fractures. "A classic feature
of the battered-child syndrome is 'multiple fractures at different stages of
healing.' "62 Inflicted fractures are caused by direct blows, twisting, shaking,
and squeezing.63 As is true with other nonaccidental injuries, there is often a
discrepancy between the parents' explanation of how a fracture happened, and
59. Feldman, supra note 56, at 201.
60. For a case where a child suffered a glove burn, see State v. Campbell, 316
N.C. 168, 340 S.E.2d 474 (1986).
61. Feldman, supra note 56, at 205-06 (citations omitted). For a case in which a
child suffered cigarette burns, see Grier v. State, 257 Ga. 584, 361 S.E.2d 379 (1987).
62. Swischuk, Radiology of the Skeletal System, in CHILD ABUSE AND NEG-
LECT: A MEDICAL REFERENCE 253, 262 (N. Ellerstein ed. 1981).
63. Id. at 254. In one case a child suffered rib fractures. An expert testified that
such injuries could not be the result of hugging. State v. Muniz, 150 N.J. Super. 436,
441, 375 A.2d 1234, 1236 (1977).
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the "mechanism required for its production. '6 4 In many cases the physician
can employ X-rays to determine that fractures occurred at different times.6 5
9. Summary
In many cases, a knowledgeable physician can differentiate accidental
from nonaccidental injury. Unbeknownst to the perpetrator, abuse often leaves
an indictment etched in human flesh. When the abuser describes how the in-
jury occurred, the explanation seems transparently improbable, even ludicrous,
and the doctor's diagnosis is confirmed.
C. Photographs as an Adjunct to Expert Testimony
In physical abuse litigation, photographs of the injured child play an im-
portant role. Few sights are more unsettling than a picture of a severely in-
jured child. The normal response combines revulsion, rage, and deep pity. Pho-
tographs can have tremendous evidentiary value, but they are also loaded with
potential prejudice. Defense counsel can be expected to mount a strong cam-
paign to keep them away from the jury. In most cases, however, the finder of
fact is permitted to see photographs of the victim.
Photographs of the child are generally admissible to clarify the testimony
of the expert, as well as for other purposes.66 Two cases provide useful guide-
64. Swischuk, supra note 62, at 262.
65. Id. at 263-69.
66. See United States v. Bowers, 660 F.2d 527, 529 (5th Cir. 1981). In Bowers
the court stated:
Appellant argues that the jury was unduly prejudiced by the government's
introduction in evidence of a color photograph of the child's lacerated heart.
The photograph was clearly relevant. Under Fed. R. Evid. 403, however, the
court may have been required to exclude the evidence "if its probative value
[was] substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." The
court's decision to allow the evidence, after striking this balance, is reversible
error only if we find that it was an abuse of discretion .... To be sure, the
photograph had the potential to inflame the jury, but we consider it no more
inflammatory than photographs that portray the sort of death suffered by the
victim in this or any other case where the circumstances surrounding death
are at issue .... The photograph, here, was essential to the government's case
if it was to meet its burden of showing that appellant brought cruel and ex-
cessive physical force to bear on her child. We cannot say that the prejudice
inherent in the photograph substantially outweighed its probative value. We
hasten to add that the mere fact that appellant stipulated with the govern-
ment as to the cause of death did not preclude the government from offering
proof on that issue.
Id. at 529-30 (citations omitted). See also State v. Swafford, 21 Ariz. App. 474, 520
P.2d 1151 (1974); Watson v. State, 290 Ark. 484, 720 S.W.2d 310 (1986) (adult mur-
der victim; case contains a good analysis of when photographs of a victim are admissi-
ble); In re Brooks, 63 Ill. App. 3d 328, 379 N.E.2d 872 (1978); State v. Conlogue, 474
A.2d 167 (Me. 1984); State v. Durfee, 322 N.W.2d 778 (Minn. 1982); Wetz v. State,
503 So. 2d 803 (Miss. 1987); State v. Hotchkiss, 127 N.H. 260, 525 A.2d 270 (1987).
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lines for the admissibility of photographs. In Watson v. State,67 the Supreme
Court of Arkansas considered the admissibility of photographs in a capital
felony murder case involving an adult victim. The court wrote:
The admissibility of photographs is within the sound discretion of the trial
court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion .... The
fact that photographs are inflammatory is not sufficient reason alone to ex-
clude them .... Inflammatory photographs are admissible in the discretion of
the trial judge if they tend to shed light on any issue, enable a witness to
better describe the objects portrayed, permit the jury to better understand the
testimony, or corroborate testimony.6 8
In Wetz v. State,69 the Mississippi Supreme Court considered the admis-
sibility of photographs taken of a battered infant while she was being treated
in the emergency room. The court found four justifications to support admis-
sion of the photographs:
First, they were properly admitted to show the condition of Kristina immedi-
ately after the incident .... Second, they portray pictorially the extent of the
head and facial trauma observed by the witnesses and described [at trial] by
Dr. Sheffield, the attending physician. Third, the pictures had the potential of
clarification, or making more certain, that which occurred .... Finally, the
photographs depicted the multiple bruises on Kristina's head which were evi-
dence of malice, an essential ingredient of the crime charged .... 71
The old bromide that a picture is worth a thousand words is nowhere
more true than in child abuse litigation, and absent a substantial showing of
unfair prejudice, courts admit photographs.
D. Foundation and Permissible Bases for Expert Testimony on Battered
Child Syndrome
Before expert testimony on battered child syndrome is admissible, the
proper foundation must be laid. This foundation consists of three components.
First, the topic of the testimony must be a proper subject for expert opinion.7 1
This requirement is satisfied if the testimony will assist the fact finder to un-
derstand the evidence or determine the facts in issue. Second, if the opinion is
based on a scientific test or principle, the test or principle must be generally
accepted in the relevant scientific community. 2 Third, the witness must be
67. 290 Ark. 484, 720 S.W.2d 310 (1986).
68. Id. at 486-87, 720 S.W.2d at 311 (citations omitted).
69. 503 So. 2d 803 (Miss. 1987).
70. Id. at 812 (citations omitted).
71. C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 13, at 33 (E. Cleary 3d ed.
1984).
72. When expert testimony is based on a scientific test or principle, the propo-
nent of the evidence must establish that the test or principle has gained general recog-
nition in the relevant scientific community. The necessity to establish the acceptability
of the test or principle is commonly referred to as the Frye test, derived from Frye v.
United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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qualified as an expert in the field. These three foundational components of
expert testimony are discussed, in subsection 1, below.
In addition to the foundational requirements for expert testimony, several
additional considerations require discussion. What are the permissible bases of
an expert's opinion? May an expert opinion be based on inadmissible evi-
dence? On prejudicial evidence? Must an expert have personal knowledge of
the facts? Can the opinion of an expert address the ultimate issue in the case?
These questions are discussed in subsection 2, below.
1. Laying the Foundation for Expert Testimony
The first foundational requirement for expert testimony is easily satisfied.
Courts routinely hold that battered child syndrome is a proper subject for ex-
pert testimony.73 Expert testimony assists the trier of fact to understand
whether a child's injuries are accidental or inflicted. As the discussion in sub-
section I B, above, makes clear, the diagnosis of battered child syndrome calls
for expertise that is well beyond the ken of the average juror. Thus, expert
testimony satisfies the requirement that it help the jury determine the facts of
the case.
The second foundational requirement is that scientific tests or princi-
ples-including battered child syndrome-must be generally accepted in the
relevant scientific community. 4 Battered child syndrome is well accepted by
medical science, and it should not be necessary to lay a foundation with regard
to acceptance of the syndrome. 5 However, in the unlikely event that a court
requires proof of general acceptance, several approaches are possible. The
foundation may be laid by demonstrating that other courts have found the
syndrome to be generally accepted. Such proof is readily at hand because all
appellate courts to consider expert testimony on battered child syndrome have
approved it.76 Another approach is to provide the court with the literature on
battered child syndrome. The stature of the authors and the number of books
and articles should persuade the court that the syndrome is generally accepted.
The most complex and time-consuming approach is to call experts on the bat-
tered child syndrome to explain the syndrome and vouch for its acceptance. To
reiterate, however, battered child syndrome is so widely accepted in the medi-
73. See, e.g., State v. Dumlao, 3 Conn. App. 607, -, 491 A.2d 404, 409
(1985) ("special skill or knowledge, beyond the ken of the average juror .... helpful to
the determination of an ultimate issue"); State v. Wilkerson, 295 N.C. 558, 569, 247
S.E.2d 905, 911 (1978) ("person of ordinary experience would not be capable of satis-
factory conclusions, unaided by expert information"); Commonwealth v. Rogers, 364
Pa. Super. 477, __ , 528 A.2d 610, 616 (1987) ("helpful to the jury's understanding
of the nature, extent, and severity of ... injuries").
74. See supra note 72. It should be noted that not all jurisdictions follow the
general acceptance test for admission of novel scientific evidence. 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M.
BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE V 703 [03] (1988).
75. See supra note 5.
76. See cases cited supra note 6.
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cal and legal worlds that foundational proof of general acceptance should be
unnecessary.
The third foundational requirement is that the witness must possess suffi-
cient "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education" to give an expert
opinion.77 Qualifying the expert usually involves eliciting information on the
witness's educational accomplishments, specialized training, and relevant expe-
rience. Thus, an expert on battered child syndrome could be asked about:
1) where she obtained her medical degree,
2) whether she is board-certified or has an area of specialty,
3) whether she received any training in the type of injuries sustained by the
child,
4) Whether she received any training, has attended any seminars, or com-
pleted any classes that specifically dealt with battered child syndrome,
5) whether she belongs to any professional organizations which focus on child
maltreatment,
6) whether she has published in the area,
7) particular experience with the type of injury (bruising, burns, fractures)
suffered by the child,
8) the number of cases of battered child syndrome which she has diagnosed or
treated,
9) the number of years in the field, and
10) whether she has been qualified as an expert on child abuse in prior
proceedings.7
8
Unless a witness is clearly unqualified, deficiencies in qualifications go to
the weight accorded the witness's testimony rather than its admissibility.79 A
witness need not be the foremost authority on battered child syndrome, nor
must she understand every nuance of the subject. In State v. Best,80 for exam-
ple, the defendant challenged the qualifications of two physicians. One was an
orthopedic surgeon and the other a radiologist. The orthopedic surgeon testi-
fied that the victim's fractured arm was probably the result of child abuse.
The radiologist testified that the twisting force required to produce the frac-
ture could not have resulted from the child sticking an arm through crib
bars.8 The defendant claimed that the surgeon was not qualified in the area of
77. FED. R. EvID. 702.
78. See, e.g., the sample questions in E. IMWINKELRIED, EVIDENTIARY FOUNDA-
TIONS 137 (1980).
. 79. See, e.g., State v. Dumlao, 3 Conn. App. 607 .... 491 A.2d 404, 409-10
(1985) ("Any deficiencies in the testimony . . . go to its weight rather than to its
admissibility. The weight and credibility to be given an expert's testimony are matters
to be decided by the factfinder.").
80. 89 S.D. 227, 232 N.W.2d 447 (1975).
81. Id. at 237, 232 N.W.2d at 453.
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child abuse and that the radiologist was not qualified on the force needed to
produce such a fracture. The court rejected both challenges. Using an "abuse
of discretion" standard of review, the South Dakota Supreme Court upheld
the trial court decision permitting the physicians to testify.82 The court noted
that "[tIhe great weight of authority holds that [requiring witnesses to be
qualified as specialists in every aspect of the diagnosis is] unnecessary, and
that, while lack of specialization may affect the weight of the testimony, the
trial judge need not find such expert testimony incompetent."83 In the great
majority of cases the expert's practice does not focus exclusively or even pri-
marily on child abuse. Yet, most pediatricians,8 4 radiologists, 8 5 pathologists, 8
and emergency room physicians" possess the training and experience required
to testify as experts on battered child syndrome.
While highly specialized expertise in the field of child abuse is not re-
quired of the expert, such expertise is certainly desirable from the proponent's
perspective. The qualifications of an expert serve two purposes. The first is
merely to surmount the foundational hurdle of convincing the judge that the
witness is qualified as an expert.88 For this purpose, a minimal level of educa-
tion and experience is sufficient. The second purpose, however, is to impress
the fact finder, and to convince it to accord great weight to the expert's opin-
ion. On this score the proponent desires an eminently qualified expert. The
more impressive the better.
2. Parameters of Expert Testimony
Once a witness is qualified as an expert on battered child syndrome, a
number of issues arise. The first concerns the basis of the expert's opinion.
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, an expert witness may state her opinion
82. Id. at 238, 232 N.W.2d at 454.
83. Id. at 239, 232 N.W.2d at 454.
84. See, e.g., People v. Gordon, 738 P.2d 404, 406 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987).
85. State v. Best, 89 S.D. 227, 237, 232 N.W.2d 447, 453 (1975).
86. See, e.g., State v. Jurgens, 424 N.W.2d 546, 549 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988)
(medical examiner); State v. Wilkerson, 295 N.C. 559, 568-69, 247 S.E.2d 905, 911
(1978); Commonwealth v. Rodgers, 364 Pa. Super. 477, -, 528 A.2d 610, 613
(1987).
87. Emergency room physicians see many cases of accidental childhood injury
and, as the court stated in State v. Mulder, 29 Wash. App. 513, 629 P.2d 462 (1981),
the battered child syndrome diagnosis is "within the area of expertise of physicians
whose familiarity with numerous instances of injuries accidentally caused qualifies
them to express with reasonable probability that a particular injury or group of injuries
to a child is not accidental or is not consistent with the explanation offered therefore."
Id. at 515, 629 P.2d at 463.
88. The qualifications of an expert are considered a question for the judge, not
the jury. For example, under Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a), the judge must be satis-
fied that the witness is qualified on the subject of the opinion before the jury can hear
the opinion.
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without specifying the factual bases for the opinion.89 As a practical matter,
however, the expert is nearly always asked to provide the factual data on
which the opinion is premised. This information may precede or follow the
opinion itself. Asking the expert to elaborate on the bases for her opinion aids
the trier of fact to understand the opinion. The explanation also provides the
expert an opportunity to build rapport with the jury and to educate the jurors
about the subject at hand. The net effect is to strengthen the impact of the
expert's testimony.
The facts on which an expert may base an opinion come from a variety of
sources. In many cases the witness has first hand knowledge of the child be-
cause the doctor was personally involved in the child's treatment or, in case of
death, because the doctor performed the autopsy. First hand knowledge is not
required, however, and a properly qualified expert may render an opinion on
battered child syndrome even though the expert has not personally examined
the child. 0 In such cases the expert learns the facts of the case by reviewing
medical and other pertinent records. In State v. Moyer,91 for example, the
defendant argued that a doctor's testimony should be excluded because the
doctor had not personally examined the child, but had simply reviewed records
and photographs of the child. The court rejected defendant's argument, and
stated:
We find no requirement and do not consider it imperative that the doctor
actually examine the child. [The doctor] was an expert, he understood the
[battered child] syndrome and he knew what factors to look for. He had suffi-
cient evidence before him from which he could formulate his expert opinion.92
In rare cases the expert learns the facts by listening to evidence at trial or
by responding to a recitation of the evidence from an attorney. In these cases
the expert is asked to respond to a hypothetical question. The once ubiquitous
hypothetical question is disappearing from practice,93 and trial counsel seldom
utilize this rather cumbersome technique to present expert testimony on bat-
tered child syndrome. Occasionally, however, a hypothetical question is an ap-
89. FED. R. EvID. 705 provides:
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give reasons
therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the
court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose
the underlying facts or data on cross-examination.
Prior to the more modern rules, such as the Federal Rules of Evidence, traditional
practice required the expert to state the factual basis prior to giving the opinion, at
least where the opinion was not based on personally observed facts. See 3 J. WEINSTEIN
& M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE § 705[01], at 705-4 (1987). This requirement
is what made hypothetical questions de rigueur - they were statements of all underly-
ing facts being considered by the expert. See 3 D. LouIsELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 399, at 703 (1979).
90. FED. R. EVID. 703.
91. 151 Ariz. 253, 727 P.2d 31 (Ct. App. 1986).
92. Id. at -, 727 P.2d at 34.
93. See supra note 89.
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propriate vehicle for presenting expert testimony."
In most jurisdictions an expert may base an opinion on information that
would not be independently admissible in evidence, provided such information
is "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in form-
ing opinions or inferences upon the subject.19 5 Permitting experts on battered
child syndrome to formulate admissible opinions on the basis of inadmissible
evidence requires the court to determine what types of facts or data are "rea-
sonably relied upon" by experts on child abuse.
The potentially inadmissible evidence that is most frequently relied on by
experts on battered child syndrome is verbal and written hearsay. Writings
that are important to a diagnosis of battered child syndrome include medical
records and police, autopsy, and social welfare agency reports. In State v.
Tanner,9" for example, the expert based his opinion of battered child syndrome
partly upon police records, an autopsy report, and the neurosurgeon's report.9"
In State v. Best,99 the expert relied on his personal observations and on hospi-
tal records.9 9 Verbal statements by the defendant, the child, and others are
often pertinent to the expert in forming a diagnosis. For example, in People v.
Gordon,100 the expert reached a diagnosis of child abuse by considering the
inconsistencies among the defendant's explanations of the child's injuries.0 1
The records and verbal statements relied on in Tanner and Gordon are poten-
tially barred by the hearsay rule. Yet, in most jurisdictions the expert may
rely on such information to formulate a diagnosis of battered child syndrome.
The question remains, however, may an expert rely on any inadmissible
evidence? For example, will any hearsay suffice,- no matter how unreliable? In
their influential treatise on the Federal Rules of Evidence, Judge Weinstein
and Professor Berger grapple with this difficult question.10 2 They identify two
views. Under the restrictive view, it is considered unreasonable to rely on hear-
94. Cf., Cohoon v. United States, 387 A.2d 1098 (D.C. 1978), where a medical
examiner who had looked at x-rays, treating physician reports, and listened to the de-
fense experts, was asked if the child's injuries were consistent with being "swung,
thrown or thrust onto a large flat surface." Id. at 1099. The defense objected that the
question assumed facts not in evidence. The court rejected this argument, stating that
"[e]ach side has the right to elicit an opinion from such a witness upon any hypotheti-
cal reasonably consistent with the evidence." Id. at 1100 (citing Moyer v. Aetna Life
Ins. Co., 126 F.2d 141, 144 (3d Cir. 1942)). In particular, the court found that, where
"appellant's explanation was medically implausible, it was reasonable and proper for
the prosecutor to inquire whether an alternative explanation would be more reconcila-
ble with the facts." Id.
95. FED. R. EvID. 703.
96. 675 P.2d 539 (Utah 1983).
97. Id. at 544.
98. 89 S.D. 227, 232 N.W.2d 447 (1975).
99. Id. at 240, 232 N.W.2d at 455.
100. 738 P.2d 404 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987).
101. Id. at 406-07.
102. 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 703[03], at 703-
16 to 22 (1987).
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say that would be excluded from evidence. The expansive view allows experts
to rely on inadmissible hearsay. Weinstein and Berger write:
It is apparent from the reported decisions that the courts are loosely divided
into two camps in interpreting the second sentence of Rule 703 [which per-
mits reasonable reliance on inadmissible evidence]... those favoring the ad-
missibility of expert testimony and those taking a far more restrictive view.
Those courts which endorse a restrictive approach do so not only in criminal
cases, ... but in civil cases as well. The difference between the restrictive and
more liberal approach to Rule 703 is one of emphasis. Both groups agree that
the trial judge must decide whether the data on which the expert relied is of a
type reasonably relied upon in his field of expertise. But the restrictive camp
imposes a further requirement: it reassesses the underlying material to deter-
mine whether it would have been excluded as hearsay for reasons bearing on
reliability, and if so finds that the expert could not reasonably have relied on
it, even though he shows that this is the type of material on which he relies in
his nontestifying, working life.
The difficulty with [the restrictive approach] lies not in the actual results but
in the court's apparent assumption that trustworthiness of the underlying data
is an independent factor which Rule 703 requires the judge to verify in order
for the expert's testimony to pass the threshold of admissibility. Were that so,
Rule 703 would be redundant since the hearsay rules would be determinative
and the second sentence of Rule 703 would be meaningless, except for saving
the proponent of the expert the inconvenience of having to offer the underly-
ing data into evidence.
The authors have found that the more liberal view works quite well in
practice. In non-jury cases the judge is fully capable of discounting the proba-
tive force of the expert's opinion by considering the source of his data. And, in
jury cases, when the matter is brought to the jurors' attention by a proper
instruction, they show a full sensitivity to the problem-in fact often discount-
ing the expert's opinion too much when it is based on hearsay or secondary
evidence of documents or the like. .... 103
The expansive view is in accord with child abuse experts' activities in the
real world, and with the spirit of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Physicians
should be permitted to base a diagnosis of battered child syndrome on hearsay
or other inadmissible evidence. The reliability of the inadmissible evidence
goes to the weight to be accorded the expert's opinion, not to its admissibility.
Rather than attack the basis of an expert's opinion in the hope of exclud-
ing the testimony altogether, a party may acquiesce in the testimony but seek
to blunt its sting by convincing the court to preclude the expert from divulging
one or more of the bases supporting the opinion. Such an argument proceeds
on the theory that disclosure of the basis of the opinion would cause unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading of the jury.1 0 4 For example, in
103. Id. at 703-17 to 19.
104. See FED. R. EvID. 403.
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People v. Gordon,105 the expert considered the defendant's "prior violent be-
havior toward the child" in forming his opinion.' 06 Although the expert was
permitted to testify, the trial court precluded him from articulating his reli-
ance on the violent behavior as a basis for his opinion, concluding that disclo-
sure of such reliance would be unduly prejudicial. 10 7 A similar argument can
be made for precluding an expert from describing her reliance on unreliable
and inadmissible hearsay statements. The danger is sometimes too great that
the jury will fail to confine its consideration of the hearsay to an evaluation of
the expert's opinion, and will instead consider it as substantive evidence of
abuse. In most cases a limiting instruction should protect against such misuse
of inadmissible information. In some cases, however, it is proper to limit dis-
closure of the bases underlying the expert's opinion.
The defendant also may attack an expert's opinion by asserting that the
opinion relates to the ultimate issue in the case and thus usurps the function of
the jury. In bygone days this objection might have succeeded. In most jurisdic-
tions today, however, expert testimony is not objectionable because it em-
braces an ultimate issue. Rule 704 of the Federal Rules of Evidence typifies
the modern approach, stating that "[tiestimony in the form of an opinion or
inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ul-
timate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." As the court concluded in
State v. Wilkerson, 08 "the inquiry should not be whether [the expert opinion]
invades the province of the jury, but ... whether the witness because of his
expertise is in a better position to have an opinion on the subject than is the
trier of fact."'' 09 The Pennsylvania Superior Court, in Commonwealth v. Rod-
gers," similarly held that battered child syndrome testimony "did not usurp
the role of the jury on deciding an ultimate issue.""' The jury is free to reject
the expert's opinion ." 2
E. Evidence of Uncharged Misconduct to Prove Nonaccidental Injury
The preceding subsections concentrated on medical evidence of battered
child syndrome. This subsection focuses upon the probative value of the de-
fendant's uncharged misconduct. While the two modes of proof achieve the
same result-proof of nonaccidental injury-they rely on different theories of
105. 738 P.2d 404 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987).
106. Id. at 406.
107. Id.
108. 295 N.C. 559, 247 S.E.2d 905 (1978).
109. Id. at 569, 247 S.E.2d at 911. One expert testified that the chest injuries
were not accidental; the other testified that the child was a "battered child" and that
the syndrome typically occurs where a caretaker injures the child. Id. at 564-65, 247
S.E.2d at 908-09.
110. 364 Pa. Super. 477, 528 A.2d 610 (1987).
111. Id. at -, 528 A.2d at 615.
112. Id.
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logical relevance.11s
A cardinal principle of American law holds that evidence of a person's
character generally is not admissible to prove that she acted in conformity
with her character on a particular occasion. Teitelbaum and Hertz describe
this principle as follows:
The law makes inadmissible, with certain exceptions, evidence relevant on the
following theory: Defendant committed a wrong in the past; defendant there-
fore has a propensity or a character trait for committing wrongful acts; there-
fore defendant is more likely to have engaged in the act for which he is on
trial than is someone not known to have this character trait . 1 4
This maxim finds expression in Rule 404(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
which states that "[e]vidence of a person's character or a trait of character is
not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a
particular occasion."
There are numerous uses of uncharged misconduct evidence which do not
violate the rule against propensity evidence. The most common are set forth in
Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the char-
acter of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportu-
nity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.
In child abuse litigation, all of these exceptions play a role.'" For present
purposes, however, discussion is limited to evidence of uncharged misconduct
offered to prove nonaccidental injury. In this regard, two theories of proof are
relevant: (1) The doctrine of chances, and (2) Proof of a person's intent when
she committed uncharged acts of abuse to establish her intent when she com-
mitted a charged act of abuse.
1. The Doctrine of Chances
Many child abuse cases stand or fall on the prosecutor's ability to over-
come a claim of inadvertence or accident. In this regard the state's evidence
frequently rests in part on the doctrine of chances or probabilities.110 In his
classic description of this mode of proof, Wigmore writes:
113. See, e.g., State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, 545 (Utah 1983). E. I, -
WINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE (1984); Myers, Uncharged Mis-
conduct Evidence in Child Abuse Litigation, 1988 UTAH L. REV. _.
114. Teitelbaum & Hertz, Evidence II: Evidence of Other Crimes as Proof of
Intent, 13 N.M. L. REV. 423, 423-24 (1983).
115. See Myers, supra note 113. The permissible uses of uncharged misconduct
evidence expressly set forth in Rule 404(b) do not exhaust the theories on which such
evidence is admissible.
116. For helpful discussion and analysis of the doctrine of chances, see E. IN-
WINKELRIED, supra note 113, § 2:05, at 2-8, 2-9.
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To prove intent, as a general notion of criminal volition or wilfulness .... the
argument.., is purely from the point of view of the doctrine of chances-the
instinctive recognition of that logical process which eliminates the element of
innocent intent by multiplying instances of the same result until it is perceived
that this element cannot explain them all. Without formulating any accurate
test, and without attempting by numerous instances to secure absolute cer-
tainty of inference, the mind applies this rough and instinctive process of rea-
soning, namely, that an unusual and abnormal element might perhaps be pre-
sent in one instance, but that the oftener similar instances occur with similar
results, the less likely is the abnormal element likely to be the true explana-
tion of them.
Thus, if A while hunting with B hears the bullet from B's gun whistling
past his head, he is willing to accept B's bad aim or B's accidental tripping as
a conceivable explanation; but if shortly afterwards the same thing happens
again, and if on the third occasion A receives B's bullet in his body, the im-
mediate inference (i.e., as a probability, perhaps not a certainty) is that B
shot at A deliberately; because the chances of an inadvertent shooting on
three successive similar occasions are extremely small; or (to put it in another
way) because inadvertence or accident is only an abnormal or occasional ex-
planation for the discharge of a gun at a given object, and therefore the recur-
rence of a similar result (here in the shape of an unlawful act) tends (increas-
ingly with each instance) to negative accident or inadvertence or self-defense
or good faith or other innocent mental state, and tends to establish (provision-
ally, at least, though not certainly) the presence of the normal, i.e., criminal,
intent accompanying such an act and the force of each additional instance
will vary in each kind of offense according to the probability that the act
could be repeated, within a limited time and under given circumstances, with
an innocent intent.2
7
Additional insight into the doctrine of chances comes from the New
Hampshire Supreme Court's 1876 decision in State v. Lapage,18 where Chief
Justice Cushing wrote:
Another class of cases consists of those in which it becomes necessary to show
that the act for which the prisoner was indicted was not accidental,-e.g.,
where the prisoner had shot the same person twice within a short time, or
where the same person had fired a rick of grain twice, or where several deaths
by poison had taken place in the same family, or where children of the same
mother had mysteriously died. In such cases it might well happen that a man
should shoot another accidently, but that he should do it twice within a short
time would be very unlikely. So, it might easily happen-that a man using a
gun might fire a rick of barley once by accident, but that he should do it
several times in succession would be very improbable.
So, a person might die of accidental poisoning, but that several persons
should so die in the same family at different times would be very unlikely.
So, that a child should be suffocated in bed by its mother might happen
117. 2 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 302, at 241 (Chadbourn rev.
1979).
118. 57 N.H. 245 (1876)
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once, but several similar deaths in the same family could not reasonably be
accounted for as accidents.119
Two hypothetical cases illustrate the use of the doctrine of chances to
disprove accident or inadvertence.
Case 1. Defendant is accused of murdering his four-year-old son. The
boy died from a skull fracture and brain injury. The defendant is charged
with inflicting these injuries. The child was rushed to the hospital, where he
died. The hospital staff noted that in addition to the fatal head injury, the
child had multiple old and new bruises on his buttocks, lower back, abdomen,
chest, and genitals. Defendant claims that the child was accident prone and
that the skull fracture was accidental. To counter this defense, the state offers
proof that the child suffered many soft tissue injuries over a six month period
of time. Defendant is not charged with the soft tissue injuries.
The state's evidence should be received to rebut the defense of accident. It
is in the nature of children to suffer minor scrapes and bruises. Furthermore,
an occasional accident causes more serious injury. It is highly unlikely, how-
ever, that a healthy child will accidentally suffer multiple serious soft tissue
injuries over a relatively short period of time. Such repeated injuries are prob-
ably the result of human design rather than accident. 120 Evidence of the
child's sad history reduces the likelihood that the fatal injury was
accidental."'
The doctrine of chances does not require proof that defendant committed
the uncharged or the charged acts of abuse. Under the doctrine, the identity of
the person or persons committing uncharged acts is unimportant. Thus, anony-
mous acts are admissible to prove that a charged act was deliberate. 122 The
119. Id. at 294.
120. See Schmitt, The Child with Nonaccidental Trauma, in THE BATTERED
CHiLD 128, 130-37 (R. Helfer & R. Kempe 4th ed. 1987).
121. Numerous child homicide cases discuss use of uncharged misconduct to re-
but a claim of accident or to prove intent. See, e.g., United States v. Leight, 818 F.2d
1297 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 356 (1987); United States v. Harris, 661
F.2d 138 (10th Cir. 1981); United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 979 (1974); United States v. Grady, 481 F.2d 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Harvy v. State, 604 P.2d 586 (Ala. 1979) (defendant did not defend on the basis of
accident, therefore, it was error to admit uncharged misconduct evidence relating to
accident); Limber v. State, 264 Ark. 479, 572 S.W.2d 402 (1978); People v. Wade, 43
Cal. 3d 366, 729 P.2d 239, 233 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1987); People v. Taggart, 621 P.2d 1375
(Colo. 1981); State v. Wilson, 199 Conn. 417, 513 A.2d 620 (1986); State v. Tucker,
181 Conn. 406, 435 A.2d 986 (1980); Bludsworth v. State, 98 Nev. 289, 646 P.2d 558
(1982); State v. Stevens, 238 N.W.2d 251 (N.D. 1975); Freeman v. State, 681 P.2d 84
(Okla. Crim. App. 1984); State v. Holland, 346 N.W.2d 302 (S.D. 1984); State v.
Tanner, 675 P.2d 539 (Utah 1983); State v. Mercer, 34 Wash. App. 654, 663 P.2d 857
(1983).
122. See, e.g., Bludsworth v. State, 98 Nev. 289, 290, 646 P.2d 558, 559 (1982).
Bludsworth involved a murder prosecution where a two-year-old victim died of head
injuries. The defendant claimed the injuries were accidental. The court wrote:
During the trial, considerable evidence was presented that Eric had sustained
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evidentiary force of the doctrine lies in its ability to persuade the trier of fact
that the charged act was deliberately caused by someone. The doctrine sheds
no light on the identity of the perpetrator, and other evidence must be intro-
duced to tie the defendant to the crime. Wigmore explains the admissibility of
anonymous acts as follows:
It will be seen that the strength of the [doctrine of chances] does not rest
exclusively on a given person's connection with the prior injurious transac-
tions. It is possible to negative accident or inadvertence, and to infer deliber-
ate human intent, without forming any conclusion as to the personality of the
doer. Thus if, one morning after a high wind, A's cellar window is found
broken, the pieces lying inside, he may well assume the probability that the
force of the wind blew the glass in; but if, on the next morning and the next,
he again finds a window broken in the same way, though no high wind pre-
vailed the night before, he gives up the hypothesis of the force of the wind as
the explanation, and concludes that deliberate human effort was the highly
probable cause of the breakage, although he can form no notion whatever of
the personality of the doer.
Thus it is thus clear that innocent intent-accident, inadvertence, or the
like-may be negatived by anonymous instances of the previous occurrence of
the same or a similar thing. After the defendant's connection with the deed
charged is assumed or proved, his innocent intent may be negatived by such
instances, which may have force for that purpose, though they are not con-
nected with the defendant.
The only limitation upon this mode of proof is that the defendant's doing
of the act in issue must be shown by other evidence at some stage of the trial;
and the anonymous instances should not be received until the trial court is
satisfied with the amount of evidence introduced or pledged for showing that
numerous bruises, including a bite mark on his scrotum, prior to the day of
his fatal injury. . . . Appellants also erroneously argue that the bite mark
evidence and evidence of other bruises were incompetent because there was no
prior establishment, by clear and convincing evidence, that either Curt or Judi
was responsible for each of the prior injuries. Admissibility of the bite mark
and other bruise evidence does not depend on connecting either defendant to
the infliction of the injury. It is independent, relevant circumstantial evidence
tending to show that the child was intentionally, rather than accidentally in-
jured on the day in question. Proof that a child has experienced injuries in
many purported accidents is evidence that the most recent injury may not
have resulted from yet another accident.
Id. at 290-91, 646 P.2d at 559. See State v. Mercer, 34 Wash. App. 654, 658, 663 P.2d
857, 861 (1983); E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note I13, § 2:05, at 2-8, 2-9; see also State
v. Stevens, 238 N.W.2d 251 (N.D. 1975). In Stevens, the court excluded evidence of
anonymous prior injuries to prove intent. However, the decision can be reconciled with
the principle that anonymous acts are admissible under the doctrine of chances to prove
intent. In Stevens the court was particularly troubled by the uncharged misconduct
evidence because the state offered the evidence to prove identity as well as intent.
When uncharged misconduct is offered to establish identity, anonymous acts are not
admissible. The court implied that if the state had limited the uncharged misconduct to
proof of intent, the evidence may have been admissible.
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connection.
1 2s
While anonymous acts are admissible under the doctrine of chances,
before such evidence may be received the state must establish a connection
between the defendant and the injured child or children. For example, suppose
the defendant is charged with murdering her child. Her defense is that the
child suffered accidental head injuries. The prosecutor cannot disprove the ac-
cident theory with evidence that, during the past year, five other children in
the city suffered head injuries. The other injuries have no connection to the
defendant. However, if the prosecutor establishes that the other victims were
all defendant's children, or were all under her care, the evidence becomes
highly relevant on the question of accidental injury. This is true even though
the state cannot prove that defendant inflicted the other injuries.
Although the evidentiary force of the doctrine of chances is not tied to the
identity of the person or persons committing uncharged acts, often the defend-
ant did in fact commit the uncharged acts. Because the identity of the actor is
irrelevant under the doctrine of chances, it is sometimes appropriate to exclude
evidence that the defendant was the actor on uncharged occasions. Excluding
such evidence reduces the possibility of unfair prejudice to the defendant.
Case 2. Defendant is the step-mother of the two-year-old victim. On Novem-
ber 16, 1988, she carried the child to a neighbor's home. The child had a
large bruise on his head, and was unconscious. Defendant told the neighbor
that, while she was dressing the youngster, he fell and hit his head on the
corner of a chair. The child was quickly taken to the hospital, where subdural
hematoma was diagnosed. Emergency surgery was performed, saving the
child's life. The government charges the defendant with child abuse. Her de-
fense is accident. The court admits testimony from the surgeon that the injury
was probably caused by a blunt, flat instrument. The doctor also testifies that
the defendant's explanation is inconsistent with the severity of the injury. The
government offers evidence that on November 2, 1988, two weeks prior to the
charged act, the child was taken to the hospital suffering from severe multiple
bruises about the face and body. The state is unable to establish that the child
was in defendant's care on the second of November.124
This case raises three important issues. First, admissibility of anonymous
acts under the doctrine of chances. Second, the applicability of the doctrine
when there is only one uncharged act. And third, the applicability of the doc-
trine when uncharged acts are not identical to the charged act. The first issue
was addressed in Case 1. The fact that the government cannot establish the
identity of the person causing the November 2nd injury does not undercut the
utility of the doctrine of chances to rebut a defense of accident.
On the second issue, some authorities state that multiple uncharged acts
are required."2 Others hold that there is no hard-and-fast rule defining the
123. 2 J. WIGMORE supra note 117, § 303, at 247-48.
124. Case 2 is based on United States v. Brown, 608 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1979).
125. See 2 WIGMORE supra note 117, § 325, at 287-88. In § 325, Dean Wigmore
discusses the doctrine of chances to prove intent in prosecutions for possession of stolen
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number of acts required to trigger the doctrine of chances. The latter position
was adopted by the Oregon Supreme Court in the case of State v. Johns,126
where the court wrote:
[I]s one prior similar incident enough to justify admission ... ? We believe
no categorical statement can be made one way or the other. Depending upon
the circumstances of the case, sometimes one prior similar act will be suffi-
ciently relevant for admissibility and sometimes not. A simple, unremarkable
single instance of prior conduct probably will not qualify, but a complex act
requiring several steps, particularly premeditated, may well qualify. These de-
cisions must be made case-by-case .... 127
Professor Edward Imwinkelried shares the Oregon court's view. In his
treatise devoted to uncharged misconduct evidence he writes that "[iin terms
of logical relevance theory, . . . even a single similar instance of conduct is
material to increase the likelihood of mens rea. So long as the defendant has
performed the act 'oftener than once,' the act has some logical relevance on
the issue of intent. 128
In Case 2 there was only one prior incident of injury to the child. Does
this single episode invoke the doctrine of chances? While credible arguments
are possible both ways, the evidence should be received. The type and severity
of the child's injuries on the prior occasion are such that they probably were
inflicted deliberately. Multiple bruises over the face and body cannot fairly be
described as a "simple, unremarkable single instance of prior conduct.1 29
Both logic and policy support the conclusion that in selected cases a single
uncharged event will suffice to trigger the doctrine of chances.
The third question raised by Case 2 is the degree of similarity required
between the charged act and uncharged acts. The authorities are in general
agreement that to invoke the doctrine of chances, the acts must be similar.
goods. He writes:
[T]he recurrence of a like act lessens by each instance the possibility that a
given instance could be the result of inadvertence, accident, or other innocent
intent. Accordingly, the argument here is that the oftener A is found in pos-
session of stolen goods, the less likely it is that his possession on the occasion
charged was innocent .... [T]he force of an argument based on the intent
theory lies in the multiplication of instances; that a single instance has from
this point of view little or no weight....
It is important to note that Wigmore does not say the doctrine of chances never
comes into play when there is only one similar occurrence. In § 325, he discusses only
possession of stolen property, and in that type of case proof of intent may well require
more than a single uncharged episode of possession. In other legal contexts where there
is but a single similar act, however, Wigmore may have approved use of the doctrine of
chances. See Comment, Admissibility of Evidence of Prior Crimes in Murder Trials,
25 IND. L.J. 64, 68 n.23 (1949-1950); Note, The Admissibility of Evidence of Extrane-
ous Offenses in Texas Criminal Cases, 14 S. TEx. L.J. 69, 96 (1973).
126. 301 Or. 535, 725 P.2d 312 (1986) (en banc).
127. Id. at 541-42, 725 P.2d at 324.
128. E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 113, § 5:06, at 5-12.
129. State v. Johns, 301 Or. 535, 555, 725 P.2d 312, 324 (1986) (en banc).
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Wigmore writes that "prior acts should be similar. Since it is the improbabil-
ity of a like result being repeated by mere chance that carries probative
weight, the essence of this probative effect is the likeness of the instance."130
While similarity is required for the doctrine of chances, the acts do not have to
be identical.131 Professor Imwinkelried observes that "[i]f the acts are similar
in material respects, the similarity justifies the admission of the acts to dis-
prove innocent intent."'3 2 In Case 2 the charged injury was a blow to the head
causing subdural hematoma. The uncharged injuries also resulted from blows.
Further, the earlier incident included head injuries which were similar to, al-
beit less severe than, the charged offense. The facts in Case 2 satisfy the simi-
larity requirement.
2. Proof of Defendant's Intent When She Committed Uncharged Acts of
Abuse to Establish Her Intent When She Committed a Charged Act of
Abuse.
In many types of criminal cases the state seeks to prove the defendant's
intent when she committed a charged act through evidence of her intent when
she committed uncharged acts. For example, in a burglary case, the state may
offer proof that, on the night defendant was apprehended inside the house she
is accused of burglarizing, she burglarized five other houses on the same block.
The fact that defendant entertained felonious intent when she committed the
uncharged burglaries renders it more likely that she harbored the same intent
when she committed the charged act. Such evidence comes perilously close to
violating the rule against propensity evidence to prove conforming conduct.'33
Nevertheless, under the prevailing view, the evidence is admissible to prove
intent.
When intent evidence is offered under the prevailing view, courts are un-
derstandably cautious. The line (if there is one) separating the legitimate use
of such evidence from inadmissible propensity evidence is extremely elusive.
Such proof carries strong potential for unfair prejudice. Jurors may be unable
to blind themselves to the fact that the defendant is "a very bad man", 13'
deserving of punishment, whether he is guilty of the charged offense or not.
When uncharged misconduct is offered under the prevailing view, the pro-
ponent must establish that the defendant committed the uncharged acts.'3 5
Anonymous acts are inadmissible because, unlike the doctrine of chances, the
prevailing view is founded on an assumption about human nature. This as-
sumption posits that when a person possesses a particular trait (criminal in-
tent) on one occasion, she is likely-not as a matter of chance or probability,
130. 2 J. WIGMORE supra note 117, § 302, at 245 (emphasis deleted).
131. E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 113, § 5:07, at 5-13.
132. Id.; See also Myers, supra note 113; Teitelbaum & Hertz, supra note 114.
133. State v. Lapage, 57 N.H. 245, 296 (1876).
134. Id. at 296.
135. See Myers, supra note 113.
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but as a matter of human nature-to possess it on other occasions as well.
Case 3 illustrates the prevailing view.
Defendant is charged with physical abuse leading to the death of her young
son. While the child was in the defendant's exclusive control, the child suf-
fered a skull fracture and fatal brain injury. The defendant argues that the
child's injury was accidental. To rebut this defense, the state offers evidence
that defendant physically abused her other two children. One of the un-
charged acts of abuse occurred prior to the charged offense and one after136
The government's uncharged misconduct evidence is admissible under the
prevailing view. When the state proves that the defendant committed the un-
charged abuse, it is possible to infer her criminal intent on those occasions.
From this intermediate inference, the ultimate inference is drawn to her intent
when she injured the deceased child.
Notice that in Case 3 the state could also rely on the doctrine of chances
to prove intent. It is possible that one of defendant's children could suffer seri-
ous accidental injury, but when more than one child is afflicted, the likelihood
of accident decreases. As the New Hampshire Supreme Court observed long
ago, "that a child should be suffocated in bed by its mother might happen
once, but several similar deaths in the same family could not reasonably be
accounted for as accidents."13 7 Courts regularly admit uncharged abuse of
other children to disprove a claim of accident.13
In Case 3, one of the uncharged acts of abuse occurred after the charged
offense. However, this should not lead to exclusion of the evidence. The tempo-
ral relationship between the uncharged misconduct and the charged offense
does not undermine the logical relevance of either uncharged act. While there
is some authority that uncharged acts must occur prior to the charged act,13
the better rule predicates admission on logical relevance, not order of
occurrence.
140
136. The facts of case 3 are drawn in part from United States v. Leight, 818
F.2d 1297 (7th Cir. 1987).
137. State v. Lapage, 57 N.H. 245, 294 (1876).
138. See, e.g., United States v. Leight, 818 F.2d 1297 (7th Cir. 1987); United
States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1973); Limber v. State, 264 Ark. 479, 572
S.W.2d 402 (1978); State v. Ostlund, 416 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (proper
to ask witness to decribe ways in which defendant was careless with other children);
People v. Tuckerman, - A.D. -, 521 N.Y.S.2d 553 (1987) (court employs
prevailing view to approve testimony that defendant had abused two children in the
same household as evidence of intent to injure the victim). For additional cases employ-
ing the prevailing view of intent evidence, see United States v. Lewis, 837 F.2d 415
(9th Cir. 1988); State v. Lee, 88 Or. App. 556, 746 P.2d 242 (1987).
139. See E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 113, § 2:11, at 2032. Indeed, many law-
yers use the phrase "prior bad acts" to describe this category of evidence.
140. See id. § 2:00, at 2-33.
1988]
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
II. ESTABLISHING THE IDENTITY OF THE PERPETRATOR
When the nonaccidental nature of child's injuries is established, the in-
quiry turns to identification of the perpetrator. Identity can be established in
many ways.
A. Eyewitness Testimony by Children""
Children frequently provide eyewitness testimony. Indeed, in child abuse
litigation the victim is-usually the only eyewitness. Thus, the reliability of eye-
witness testimony by children frequently assumes great importance. Psycholo-
gists continue their experimental investigation of the reliability of eyewitness
testimony, and while few definite answers are available, enough is known to
make two statements: (1) children often provide reliable, accurate testimony
and (2) psychological experiments on eyewitness testimony by young preschool
children indicate that the testimony of such children should be considered with
a measure of caution.
In a review of the psychological literature published in 1984, Professors
June Chance and Alvin Goldstein report that most of the studies on face rec-
ognition in children reveal that younger children perform less well than older
children and adults. Chance and Goldstein write:
[T]he level of accuracy, as assessed by correct identifications, increases with
subjects' age .... At kindergarten level, percent correct [identifications]
falls between 35 and 40% - or only slightly above chance; at 6 to 8 years,
between 50 and 58%; at 9 to 11, between 60 and 70%; and at ages 12 to 14,
between 70 and 80%. This latter range of performance is quite similar to that
found for adults .... These findings suggest that children past age 12 years
of age are equal to adults in their performance on face-recognition tasks but
that younger children are worse. Nonetheless, one must caution that these
findings tell us about children's performances only under laboratory condi-
tions; recognition memory assessed in a situation more closely resembling the
real-life situation might be different. 142
Thus, young children make a substantial number of face recognition er-
rors. Chance and Goldstein report a more disturbing finding, however. Young
children also tend to make more inaccurate identifications than older children
and adults. Chance and Goldstein write:
When false alarm data are reported, rates of false positive responding de-
crease with increased age ... Young school-age children make quite a few
false identifications in proportion to their opportunities to do so; the rate of
adolescents (13 years and older) differ little from those of adults.14 3
141. This subsection is extracted from J. MYERS, CHILD WITNESS LAW AND
PRACTICE 251-54 (1987).
142. Chance & Goldstein, Face-Recognition Memory: Implications for Chil-
dren's Eyewitness Testimony, 40 J. Soc. IssuEs 69, 71 (1984) (citations omitted); see
also Children's Eyewitness Memory (S. Ceci, M. Toglia & D. Ross eds. 1987).
143. Chance & Goldstein, supra note 142 at 72.
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In his book on eyewitness testimony,""' Professor Taylor echoes several of
the concerns articulated by Chance and Goldstein. Taylor writes:
Age can clearly be a factor in a person's ability to perceive an event and later
recall it accurately. Generally speaking, psychologists have shown through re-
peated experiments that there is an improvement of eyewitness capability to
the ages of about fifteen or twenty...
A child is constantly in a process of development, and his ability to ob-
serve, identify an object in his mind, relate it to his environment, remember it,
later recall it, and match it with another object - e.g., identify a suspect as
the perpetrator seen earlier - will vary according to his stage of develop-
ment. This is more apparent in the ability to recognize faces... [A] group of
twelve to fourteen-year-olds will identify better than six to nine-year-olds, and
... eleven-year-olds will outperform eight-year-olds - who will, in turn, do
better than five-year-olds. 1"
While psychological research raises questions about eyewitness testimony
by young children, it does not support the conclusion that such testimony
should be automatically rejected. On the contrary, many litigated cases turn
on eyewitness testimony by children, and appellate courts correctly affirm
judgments that are based solely or partially on such evidence. 146 For example,
in People v. Nance,1 47 the court wrote:
The defendant was convicted of the rape, sodomy and sexual abuse of a 13-
year-old girl. His claim that the victim's eyewitness testimony was insufficient
to convict him beyond a reasonable doubt is without merit. It is clear that the
testimony was highly reliable. The defendant was identified by both the vic-
tim and her mother from a photo array just two days after the incident.
Moreover, he was again identified at a Wade hearing and then again at a trial
by both women. Due to the horrifying circumstances of the attack, it is clear
that the victim's attention was clearly focused on the defendant and there was
ample time and good light during the attack. Moreover, the descriptions given
by the victim and her mother were remarkably consistent and accurate.
Under the circumstances, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the People, it is clear that the testimony of both eyewitnesses was credible
... . It is well settled that the accuracy of an eyewitness identification
presents an issue of fact for the jury.148
When assessing the reliability of a child's eyewitness testimony, a number
of factors should be considered.1 49 Was the child familiar with the person to be
identified? Familiarity may increase the accuracy of testimony. 150 How much
144. L. TAYLOR, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1982).
145. Id. § 1-3.1, at 14-18.
146. See, e.g., People v. Grady, 133 Misc. 2d 211, 506 N.Y.S.2d 922 (Sup. Ct.
1986).
147. 118 A.D.2d 664, 500 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1986).
148. Id. at 665, 500 N.Y.S.2d at 13 (citations omitted).
149. See generally Chance & Goldstein, supra note 142; Goodman & Reed, Age
Differences in Eyewitness Testimony, 10 L. & HuM. BEHAV. 317 (1986).
150. See Johnson & Foley, Differentiating Fact from Fantasy: The Reliability
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time did the child have to observe the person or event? How much time
elapsed between the event and the child's testimony? The longer the delay, the
greater the possibility that a child's memory will fade or be distorted through
improper suggestion. Was the person disguised? Was the child so upset by the
event that the ability to perceive accurately was impaired?" 1 Was the child
paying close attention, or was she distracted? 152 Was the lighting adequate?
How far away was the child from the event or person to be identified? How
old was the child when the event occurred? Preschool children experience
more difficulty than older children with the cognitive tasks involved in eyewit-
ness identification. Is the child bright or dull?15 3 Did investigating officials em-
ploy suggestive identification procedures? These and other factors may affect
the accuracy of eyewitness testimony.'
In the context of eyewitness testimony by children, it is important to con-
sider the possibility that postevent suggestion, often in the form of leading
questions, has distorted a child's memory. A significant number of children are
subjected to postevent suggestion which may corrupt their recollection of
of Children's Memory, 40 J. Soc. Issuas 33, 36 (1984) (when it comes to recognition
of familiar faces, "there appear to be few age differences in whatever acquisition and
remembering processes are responsible" for such recognition).
151. See Stewart, Perception, Memory, and Hearsay: A Criticism of Present
Law and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 1, 8-22, 26. In
this article, Professor Stewart criticizes the excited utterance exception to the hearsay
rule:
The most unreliable type of evidence admitted under hearsay exceptions is the
excited utterance.
Excitement is not a guarantee against lying, especially since the courts often
hold that excitement may endure many minutes and even hours beyond the
event. More important, excitement exaggerates, sometimes grossly, distortion
in perception and memory especially when the observer is a witness to a non-
routine, episodic event such as occurs in automobile collision cases and
crimes.
Id. at 28 (citations omitted).
152. See People v. Nance, 118 A.D.2d 664, 500 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1986). In this case
the court upheld a conviction based on the testimony of a 13-year-old victim. The court
stated that "[d]ue to the horrifying circumstances of the attack, it is clear that the
victim's attention was clearly focused on the defendant." Id. at 665, 500 N.Y.2d at 13.
153. On the effect of intelligence on eyewitness identification, see Chance &
Goldstein, supra note 142, where the authors write:
Are age differences in face-recognition performance related to individual dif-
ferences among children in their rate of cognitive development? Will a rela-
tively bright child perform better than a relatively dull one? Almost no evi-
dence concerning this question is available, although common sense would
suggest that information on this point might be invaluable to judges who must
decide whether to admit children's testimony in court .... Published studies
of adults report little or no correlation between intelligence and face
recognition.
Id. at 74.
154. Id. at 75-76.
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events. The psychological literature indicates that such questioning can cause
inaccurate eyewitness testimony.15 5 Elizabeth Loftus and Graham Davies
write that "[i]n a legal situation, witnesses are questioned by relatives, police,
and attorneys. What they report may be a blend of information they them-
selves have experienced and new details provided or constructed in the course
of questioning." 156
Many believe that children are always more suggestible than adults.
However, the scientific evidence is clearly to the contrary. Research discloses
that by the time children are three or four years old they are quite resistant to
suggestion about things that have personal significance to them.15 7 Thus, chil-
dren can and do provide accurate eyewitness testimony.
B. Expert Testimony on Battered Child Syndrome
as Evidence of Identity
All courts agree that a properly qualified expert may give an opinion on
whether a child's injuries are accidental or nonaccidental. A few courts go
further, and permit the expert to opine that the child's injuries were probably
caused by an individual "caring" for the child. Such testimony narrows the
class of potential perpetrators to a group including the defendant. In People v.
Jackson 6" the California Court of Appeal wrote:
[t]he additional finding that the injuries were probably occasioned by some-
one who is ostensibly caring for the child is simply a conclusion based upon
logic and reason. Only someone regularly "caring" for a child has the contin-
uing opportunity to inflict these types of injuries; an isolated contact with a
vicious stranger would not result in this pattern of successive injuries stretch-
ing through several months."5 9
Most courts reject the rationale of the Jackson case, and the majority of deci-
sions hold that an expert may not offer testimony which attributes fault to a
particular person or to a class of persons.16 '
155. List, Age and Schematic Differences in the Reliability of Eyewitness Testi-
mony, 22 DEvELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 50, 57 (1986) ("One of the most consistent
findings in psychological research on eyewitness testimony is the influence of leading
question or postevent information on memory."). See generally Clifford & Scott, Indi-
vidual and Situational Factors in Eyewitness Testimony, 63 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY
352 (1978); Dodd & Bradshaw, Leading Questions and Memory: Pragmatic Con-
straints, 19 J. VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAV. 695 (1980); Loftus & Davies,
Distortions in the Memory of Children, 40 J. Soc. IssuEs 51 (1984); Loftus, Leading
Questions and the Eyewitness Report, 7 COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 560 (1975).
156. Loftus & Davies, Distortions in the Memory of Children, 40 J. Soc. IssuEs
51, 53 (1984).
157. Goodman & Reed, Age Differences in Eyewitness Testimony, 10 L. &
HuM. BEHAv. 317 (1986).
158. 18 Cal. App. 3d 504, 95 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1971).
159. Id. at 507, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 921.
160. See, e.g., State v. Dumlao, 3 Conn. App. 607, -, 491 A.2d 404, 410
(1985) ("The expert witness should not be permitted to testify whether 'the battered
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C. Uncharged Misconduct Evidence to Establish Identity
Proof of defendant's uncharged misconduct plays an important role in es-
tablishing identity. In his treatise on uncharged misconduct evidence, Profes-
sor Imwinkelried writes:
It is well settled that the prosecutor may use the defendant's uncharged mis-
conduct to prove the defendant's identity as the perpetrator of the charged
crime. There is an enormous body of decisional law sanctioning this theory of
logical relevance. . . .Proof of the defendant's misconduct is more readily
admissible to prove the defendant's identity than for other purposes .... "I
Identity may be established through uncharged misconduct which establishes
motive, opportunity, plan, preparation, consciousness of guilt or modus
operandi.
162
D. Admissions by Parents
When children are abused, the parents' explanation is often improbable or
even impossible. In such cases, physicians rely on the disparity between the
medical facts and the proffered explanation to reach a diagnosis of battered
child syndrome.1 6 3
In addition to their utility as a basis for expert testimony, improbable or
impossible explanations sometimes constitute admissions. Such admissions evi-
dence consciousness of guilt, and as such, are admissible to identify the parent
as the abuser. In Payne v. State,"" for example, the defendant was convicted
of abusing an eleven-month-old infant. When the child was examined, the doc-
tor discovered a broken neck. The defendant told the doctor that the child hurt
herself falling off a porch step several days earlier. Defendant also told the
doctor that the child fell off a couch the night before she was taken to the
doctor's office. Apart from the neck injury, bruises were found on the child's
child syndrome from which this victim suffered was in fact caused by any particular
person or class of persons engaging in any particular activity or class of activities.' ");
Commonwealth v. Rogers, 364 Pa. Super. 477, 528 A.2d 610, 614 (1987) ("[T]he
expert's testimony on the syndrome is not an opinion regarding the culpability of any
particular defendant. Such testimony is not accusatory. . . ."); see also State v. Durfee,
322 N.W.2d 778, 783 (Minn. 1982); State v. Wilkerson, 295 N.C. 559, 570, 247
S.E.2d 905, 911 (1978); ("battered child syndrome evidence is not itself probative of
who did the battering and without additional evidence, would be inadequate as a mat-
ter of law to convict").
161. E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 113, § 3:02, at 3-4 (footnotes omitted); see
also 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5246, at
511-16 (1978).
162. E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 113, §§ 3:01 to 3:29, at 3-I to 3-75; 22 C.
Wright & K. Graham, supra note 161, § 5246, at 511-16; 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BER-
GER, supra note 102, § 404[15], at 404-112 to 404-117; Myers, supra note 113.
163. For discussion of the diagnostic importance of parents' explanations of in-
jury, see section I. A. of the text.
164. 21 Ark. App. 243, 731 S.W.2d 235 (1987).
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head, face, tongue, forearm, chest, abdomen, shoulders, hip, and genitals. The
child also had multiple rib fractures. In light of the medical facts, the defend-
ant's explanation was patently untenable. Such a lame excuse cast a shadow of
suspicion over the defendant. The Arkansas Court of Appeals concluded that
defendant's excuse was admissible against him, writing that "a jury may con-
sider and give weight to any false and improbable statements made by an
accused in explaining suspicious circumstances." 16 5
E. Behavior That One Would Not Expect of an Innocent Parent
When a seriously injured child is rushed to the hospital, or when
paramedics arrive at the home, abusive parents sometimes behave in odd ways
which indicate consciousness of guilt. For example, in People v. Henson,"6' a
severely battered four-year-old was rushed to the hospital, where he was pro-
nounced dead on arrival. When the mother was informed that her child was
dead, she said, "Oh God, what will they do to us now. '1 11 Hardly the cry of
anguish one would expect from a concerned parent. In State v. Johnson,"6 8 the
prosecutor offered testimony from a fire fighter who responded to a call for
emergency medical help. The fire fighter was permitted to testify that "'the
actions of ... [Defendant] did not seem ... to be the usual actions or con-
cerns of a parent with a child in that situation.' "I'l9
F. Establishing Identity with Evidence that the Defendant Had Exclusive
Custody of the Child When Nonaccidental Injury Occurred
When a parent denies that she caused nonaccidental injury, the state may
establish identity with evidence that the parent had exclusive custody of the
child when the injury occurred.1 7 0 Such evidence often takes the form of a
process of elimination in which all potential abusers except the accused are
systematically excluded as possible perpetrators.
165. Id. at 247, 731 S.W.2d at 236; see Watson v. State, 290 Ark. 484, 489, 720
S.W.2d 310, 312 (1986). In Watson, the defendant was convicted of the capital felony
murder of an adult. The court wrote:
The jury could consider Watson's statements, which at first were denial,
then an admission of being there and then a statement that he burned the
body to hide the evidence. A jury may consider and give weight to any false,
improbable, and contradictory statements made by an accused explaining sus-
picious circumstances.
Id. See also cases cited supra note 29.
166. 33 N.Y.2d 63, 304 N.E.2d 358, 349 N.Y.S.2d 657 (1973).
167. Id. at 66, 304 N.E.2d at 359, 349 N.Y.S.2d at 659.
168. 135 Wis. 2d 453, 400 N.W.2d 502 (Ct. App. 1986).
169. Id. at 461, 400 N.W.2d at 506.
170. For a good example of the exclusive custody aproach, see People v. Henson,
33 N.Y.2d 63, 304 N.E.2d 358, 349 N.Y.S.2d 657 (1973); see also People v. M.V.,
742 P.2d 326 (Colo. 1987); State v. McClary, 207 Conn. 233, , 541 A.2d 96,
101 (1988).
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G. Res Ipsa Loquitur
In a number of states, the juvenile court may rely on the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur to assume jurisdiction over an abused child.171 For example, a
California statute provides:
Where the court finds, based on competent professional evidence, that an in-
jury ... sustained by a minor, of such a nature as would ordinarily not be
sustained except as the result of the unreasonable or neglectful acts or omis-
sions of either parent, the guardian, or other person who has the care or cus-
tody of the minor, such evidence shall be prima facie evidence that the mi-
nor's home is an unfit place for him by reason of the cruelty to him by either
of his parents, his guardian, or other person who has the care or custody of
said minor, and such proof shall be sufficient to support a finding that the
minor is [within the court's jurisdiction.]12
In effect, such statutes permit the juvenile court to protect a child even though
the state cannot establish the identity of the abuser.
H. Proof of Identity Not Necessary for Juvenile Court Jurisdiction
In some cases the state can prove that a child suffered nonaccidental in-
jury, but cannot marshall sufficient evidence to identify the abuser. Under
some statutory definitions of child abuse, a juvenile court can assume jurisdic-
tion over a child despite lack of evidence identifying the perpetrator.1 73
III. CONCLUSION
Physical abuse of children is pervasive. The American Humane Associa-
tion reports that "[iun 1985, an estimated 1,928,000 children were reported for
child abuse and neglect to child protective service agencies in the United
States and participating jurisdictions. The rate of reporting is estimated at
30.6 children per 1,000 U.S. child population in 1985.11174 American Humane
indicates that "the number of official reports of child abuse and neglect has
risen 223 percent nationally since 1976.""57 Further, the rate of serious physi-
cal abuse appears to be on the rise. Newsweek magazine reports:
The increase in abuse-related deaths is especially disturbing. A survey by the
National Committee for Prevention of Child Abuse found a 23 percent in-
crease in such deaths between 1985 and 1986. Those statistics don't tell the
171. See Michaels, Evidentiary Issues in Cases Involving Children, in FOUNDA-
TIONS OF CHILD ADVOCACY 103-04 (D. Bross & L. Michaels eds. 1987).
172. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 355.1 (West 1987).
173. See In re Christina T., 184 Cal. App. 3d 630, 229 Cal. Rptr. 247 (1986)
(sexual abuse case).
174. AMERICAN HUMAN ASSOCIATION, HIGHLIGHTS OF OFFICIAL CHILD NEG-
LECT AND ABUSE REPORTING 1985, at 2 (1987).
175. KANTROWITZ, How to Protect Abused Children, Newsweek Nov. 23, 1987,
at 70.
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whole story. Some deaths listed as accidents and sudden infant death syn-
drome may actually be related to child abuse. Officially, 1,200 children died
of abuse [in 1986]; some experts say, however, that the true figure is probably
closer to 5,000. Babies are at the highest risk. Recent surveys by Los Angeles
County and the State of Illinois found that 75 percent of the victims in those
areas were one year old or younger. Half of the children are beaten to death;
the rest die from neglect because their parents fail to supervise them or pro-
vide adequate medical care.2
1
The legal system cannot solve the enigma of child abuse, and in some
cases legal intervention may do more harm than good. 77 Yet, despite its short-
comings, legal intervention plays an indispensable role in the societal response
to maltreatment. There is no question that juvenile court proceedings protect
countless children. Furthermore, criminal prosecution is appropriate in many
cases. While the legal system cannot guarantee children a safe and nurturing 0
environment in which to live and grow, the law helps stem the tide of abuse.
176. Id.
177. See Myers, The Legal Response to Child Abuse: In the Best Interest of
Children?, 24 J. FAM. L. 149 (1985-1986).
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